Populism Contestation in Indonesia Post-Islamist Mass Mobilization
By: Andri Purnawan
Introduction
The rise of socio-religious mass mobilization is part of the global wave of populism, the notion of political reality in the form of a diametric opposition between 'the people' and 'the elite,' and the populist agenda contains the reversal of institutional networks seen as the interests of the elite conspiracy to straddle the people. Populism sweeps the world in the form of religious populism, ethnic/racial populism, class populism, national populism, and populism of civilization.[1]
In Indonesia, social, political phenomena that occur also shows the dynamics of populism that involve religious groups, nationalists, and mixed with elite agenda. The purpose of this paper is to answer the question, why did Islamic populism succeed in overthrowing Ahok, but failed to overthrow Jokowi, or prevent him from being elected for the second time as President of the Republic of Indonesia? I will argue that the combination of the fragmentation of Islamic in Indonesia civil society, pragmatic character of new Islamic populism, and Jokowi inclusive technocratic populism style is compatible with pragmatism and pluralistic Indonesian context.
Mass Mobilization and Islamic Populism
FPI, along with hundred Islamist organizations, succeeded in mobilizing mass mobilization in 2016 and overthrow Ahok, the Chinese governor who has been flourish in Jakarta. Initially, Ahok has broad support because of his capability to manage the effective and efficient bureaucracy of Jakarta (74% approval rating). At the same time, fears of Chinese domination arose. The combination of Ahok’s skill, courage, and non-cooperative in Ahok's leadership style evokes jealousy and racial sentiment. Efforts to bring him down through corruption issue (Sumber Waras Hospital) was failed, then raised religious issue, through propaganda prohibition on choosing kafir leaders or non-Muslims.
The situation became tense when Ahok called his political opponents cowardly, by citing QS Al Maidah 51, in Kepulauan Seribu, on September 27, 2016. Ahok's statement video edited, disseminated on social media, and used as frame tools that Ahok had been blaspheming the Koran. The accusation was later legitimized by the MUI religious opinion Ahok's statement was categorized as (1) insulting the Koran and or (2) insulting the ulema, which had legal consequences. The MUI urged law enforcement for the sake of justice to the Muslim community.[2] Furthermore, massive agitation in social media, mosques propagandize about the blasphemy from Islam's enemy resulting in massive mass mobilization in "Aksi Bela Islam” in a couple of demonstrations. The peak of mass mobilization on December 2, 2016, "action of 212," followed by 500 thousand to 7 million participants.[3]
The mobilization became one of the critical moments in Jokowi's regime's grave concern. The government spends a security budget of 76 billion rupiahs, to mobilize 20,000 personnel in the 411 demonstrations and 27,000 security personnel in 212 demonstrations. The Indonesian republic's finance ministry even disbursed Rp.95 billion to anticipate future actions in 2016.[4] The government's acute attention to the Islamic defense action is because there are allegations that some parties want to take advantage of the action to bring down the Jokowi government.[5] After Ahok was overthrown, and sentenced to prison for two years, the network of action activists continued to move and became an electoral political mobilization engine. They called themselves alumni 212 and positioned themselves diametrically with the government. Besides, mass mobilization has triggered political intolerance increase in Indonesia.
The Rise of Political Intolerance
PPIM and Convei Indonesia released a survey conducted in the span of 1 September to 7 October 2017 and involved 2,181 people, consisting of 1,522 students and 337 students and 264 teachers and 58 lecturers of Islamic religious education in 34 provinces. The survey shows that students and under-graduate students tended to be intolerant, reflected in the distribution of radical opinions, external tolerance, and internal tolerance of students. Of the three categories, the religious views of students who were considered the most intolerant were found in radical opinion (58.5%), followed by internal intolerance opinion (51.1%), and external intolerance opinion (34.3%). While in terms of action, it appears that students have religious behavior that tends to be moderate/tolerant. Those considered to be included in the category of radical action were only 7.0%, and external intolerance actions were 17.3%. Nevertheless, on the act of internal intolerance, it tends to be higher, by 34.1%. The surprising data are shown in the teacher and lecturer, 69,3 % of them act of internal tolerance, and 56,76% doing implicit radicalism. Relates to issues Islam as the victim, 62,11% teacher and lecturer believe that Islam is on the oppressed condition, and 54,35% believe that non-Muslim are more prosperous than Muslims.[6]
Meanwhile, LSI (Indonesian Survey Institute) has released an increase of political intolerance in 2016-2018. According to LSI, in 2016, 39% of respondents expressed objections to non-Muslims becoming regents or mayors. This figure increased in August 2017 by 47 percent and 52 percent in August 2018. Then, the number of Muslims who objected to non-Muslim governors also increased from 40 percent in 2016 to 48 percent in 2017. The figure rose again to 52 percent in August 2018. Moreover, there was 55 percent of Muslim respondents who objected to being led by non-Muslim vice presidents in August 2018. This figure increased compared to August 2016, which was 41 percent and 50 percent in August 2017. Finally, this survey shows the number of Muslims who object if non-Muslims become president increases from 48 percent in August 2016 to 53 percent in August 2017 and 59 percent in August 2018. The trend is inversely proportional to non-Muslim respondents who mostly say they do not mind if Muslims become political leaders. As many as 78 percents of non-Muslims stated that they did not mind Muslims being mayors/ regents, 78 percent did not mind Muslims being governors, 86 percent said they did not mind Muslims being vice-president, and 86 percent said they did not mind Muslims being president.
From the Islamist Mass mobilization 2016, PPIM and LSI survey found a close relationship between populism with economics and politics. Marcus Mietzner argues that Islamist mobilization in 2016 does not have a direct relationship with the surge of religious conservatism in Indonesia. The argument based on the research that since 2010-2016 radicalism and conservatism had been weakening.[7] Furthermore, political intolerance was mobilized by political entrepreneurs, as well as middle-highly educated Muslims; meanwhile, the object of mass is Muslims with a low economic level.[8] The success of mobilizing the masses and evoking "Islamic solidarity" at the national level has made the populist Islamist elite target more strategic influences through efforts to defeat Jokowi as an incumbent.
Islamist Populism in Electoral Arena
According to Hefner, populism is a form of politic put diametrical opposition between majority people, that assumed as good and virtuous, versus elites, that assumed as a tyrant, immoral, corrupt, and oppressive.[9] Meanwhile, Vedi Hadiz, in Islamic Populism in Indonesia and the Middle East, argues that populism arose as reactions of social dislocation and marginalization that resulted from neoliberal globalization.[10] Hadiz elucidates several approaches how about political contestations defines in populism, namely ideational approach- the idea comes from the leader; organizational approach with tends uses a direct connection to people rather than institutions that are perceived failure; a discursive approach based on the historical memory of a nation, like Pancasila or American dream.[11] However, for Hadiz, populism is formed from multi-class alliances with diverse expectations, a particular party more dominant then others, therefore the populism character is liquid, quickly shift on its owns contestation and agenda, even conflictual.[12]
Under the perspective of political economy, Hadiz saw that the phenomenon of Islamic populism (a movement that presupposes alliances based on the similarity of the identity of fellow Muslims) could not be separated from the crisis of trust in the promises of modernity and global capitalism about prosperity that never realized. The emergence of Islamic populism is a form of protest over the economic structure of capitalism. Islamic populism becomes an alternative to fixing the deteriorating conditions of the political economy as well as functioning as a tool to be able to get resources and power. For Hadiz, new Islamic populism is a movement relates to "marginality, social dislocation, and uncertainty" rather than the ambition to establish an Islamic State that implements strict Sharia.[13] With this understanding, Islamic populism today is a different phenomenon compared to Islamic populism in previous periods. If Islamic populism in the past was closely related to efforts to framing the political identity of Muslims to oppose instruments and initiate the establishment of an Islamic state, new Islamic populism is more about enforcing dignity of Islamic identity as a means of gaining resources and power on a domestic political scale.
Michael Buehler also describes the style of Islamism, which economics and political electoral oriented. According to Buehler's research in the Indonesian district, that implement Shari’a bylaws, shari’a bylaws is not about moral enforcement, or political symbolism, but relates with a political gain of the local leader.[14] Even, Shari’a bylaws indicate the broader change "in the patterns of power accumulation and political corruption in Indonesian local politics."[15] For instance, Buehler captures the collect zakat policy as a means of obtaining regional financial resources that benefit local leaders. Also, the formation of Koran recitation groups makes accessible networks as basis constituent for electoral interests.[16]
Pragmatic Indonesian Islamic populism is quite different from another majoritarian populism like Hindutva in India, that combines cultural nationalism and political strategies aimed at striking social domination by attaining sharp grip instrument of state power. According to Chatterji, Hindutva populism using pro-corporate and upper-caste policy combined with anti-minority rhetoric that accused minorities as the real threat of the Hindu majority. The people are not only defined as the victim but as the native as landowner of India. After coming to power, they implemented a system of sweeping positions of power, without making room for pluralism, even anti-minority.[17] Meanwhile, Hanson, in Saffron Wave, captures anxiety about Muslims over the last few decades triggered Hindus as the majority to use democracy as an instrument to reach power through Hindu nationalism.[18] Even Muslim is seen as a "constitutive defect" that has to be cleansed for the sake of India's resurgence.[19]
Brubaker argues that populism has both a vertical and horizontal dimension. For Brubaker populism "best understood not as a one-dimensional space, structured by the vertical opposition between 'the people' and 'the elite,' but as a two-dimensional space that is at once a space of inequality (economic, political and cultural) and space of difference (of culture, values and ways of life).”[20] In the horizontal relation, "the people" understood as a community, and relate with exclusion-inclusion aspect.[21] Both populism and nationalism seem different, but “not analytically independent: as intersecting and mutually implicated though not fully overlapping fields of phenomena.”[22]
Indeed, Islamist populism applies the politic of exclusion and inclusion. The people are identified as the ummah, the majority who are suffering throughout history; meanwhile, outside the ummah is secular, Chinese capitalist is the elites in diametrical position with ummah.[23] However, not like Modi populism that is using democracy and ideology anti-minority and ambition to establishing Hindu-State, Indonesian Islamic populism to attain social order jostle with secular-nationalist populism "inviting" elite to use it as arena competition to access social power.[24]
For instance, in the case of Indonesian Presidential electoral in 2019, difficult to distinguish between nationalists and Islamists. Alumni 212 supported party who not pure Islamist, even secular-nationalist candidates who did not have significant Islamic background, namely Prabowo Subianto and Sandiaga Uno. However, they still using Islamist populism, combined with "ultra-nationalist confrontational"[25] of Prabowo style, by blow-up issues: (1) The government has suppressed Islam, and protect the enemies of Islam, (2) Economic issues about state breaking the record of debt in the history of Indonesia, (3) The corruption and fraud of government policy, (4) Imaginative issue of Indonesia disband in 2030. All of the propaganda spread from social media, religious community meetings (pengajian) massively. Consequently, people experience confusion, anxiety, and division in their daily relationships because of their political aspirations. Emotional tension happened not only between people and the elite but also between people to "the other" people.
On the other hand, borrow Mietzner term, Jokowi, as the incumbent continues his "technocratic, intra-systemic" populism. He embraces Islam and establishing a coalition with moderate Islamic parties such as PPP and PKB; propose the head of the Indonesian Ulema Council, K.H. Makruf Amien as a vice presidential candidate; approaching Nahdatul Ulama and Muhamadyah as the largest Islamic organization in Indonesia; involving Yusril Izha Mahendra who represent Islam- from Masyumi background. Parallel with the opposing party, the incumbent using inclusivity plus majoritarian issue, namely: (1) Unity in diversity and nationalism, (2) The Nationalist populist collaborating with the cultural movement of moderate Islam. They see that the majority of Indonesian Islam rahmatan lil alamin (Islam as a mercy to the universe) has been tainted by a small group of political hardliners, who intend to overthrow the legitimate government. Therefore, the call "the majority" to stand up and speak up, even fight. In the East Java, for instance, the counterbalance movement is generated by Gusdurian, a couple of moderate-progressive Pesantren like Pondok Ngalah-Pasuruan, Roemah Bhinneka (House of diversity) the alliance of civil society, scholars, human rights activist, and Interfaith Dialog movement (3) Disband Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia – that labeled as the separative minority (4) Establishing the Pancasila Ideology Development Board, (5) Dismantling and exposing flaws of important figures opposition, such as Rizieq Shihab and Ratna Sarumpaet to shows the moral corruption of the opposition.
From this example, we can see the overlap between Islamic populism and nationalism in Indonesia. Both embraced Islam, used the logic of majoritarianism in different perspectives, and placed each other as elites and minorities who were dangerous to the people.[26]
The inclusivity approach is a common characteristic of Indonesian nationalist populists. What Jokowi did is re-echoing Sukarno, who initiated Nasakom (Nationalist, Religious, and Communist) to maintain his political power. However, Sukarno put ideological consideration over the pragmatism. During the Old Order, President Sukarno, on the one hand, accommodated Muslim figures (especially from Nahdatul Ulama) but simultaneously bulldozed other Muslim figures (especially from Masjumi) who were contra with his power.[27] However, Jokowi is more pragmatic than Sukarno. He invites a multi ideological background party to join with him. Even after his second win, conflict over the different election results soon diminishes because Jokowi embraces PAN and Gerindra and offers power-sharing, including Prabowo Subianto appointed as Minister of Defense.
Conclusion
To conclude, Islamist and nationalist populism in Indonesia are liquid. The involvement of elites, political entrepreneurs in the populism movement, on the one hand, increases conservatism, but at the same time enables Islamists and nationalists to overlap and collaborate in the pragmatic interests of power. The critical factor of Jokowi's victory is his inclusive and pragmatic approach to embrace as many people as possible become his political alliances. Two successive victories Jokowi confirms the reality, for a pluralistic Indonesian context, confrontational approaches of Islamist, and ultra-nationalist populism would be tough to defeat inclusive and pragmatic populist approach.
Bibliography
Buehler, Michael. The Rise of Shari'a By-laws in Indonesian Districts: An Indication for Changing Patterns of Power Accumulation and Political Corruption. Southeast Asia Research 16, no. 2,2008.
Brubaker, Rogers. Populism and Nationalism. Nations and Nationalism 26, no. 1 (2020):
Chatterji, Angana P., Chatterji, A.P., Hansen, Thomas Blom, Hansen, T.B., Jaffrelot, Christophe, and Jaffrelot, C. Majoritarian State: How Hindu Nationalism Is Changing India. Oxford University Press, 2019
Hadiz, Vedi R, Richard Robison, and Angelos Chryssogelos. "Competing Populisms in Post-authoritarian Indonesia." International Political Science Review 38, no. 4 (2017):
________ Islamic Populism in Indonesia and the Middle East. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2016
Hansen, Thomas Blom. The Saffron Wave: Democracy and Hindu Nationalism in Modern India. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999
Mietzner, Marcus, and Burhanuddin Muhtadi. "Explaining the 2016 Islamist Mobilisation in Indonesia: Religious Intolerance, Militant Groups and the Politics of Accommodation." Asian Studies Review, 42, no. 3 (2018): 481, 493.
__________ Reinventing Asian Populism: Jokowi's Rise, Democracy, and Political Contestation in Indonesia. Policy Studies, no. 72 (2015)
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Andre Munro, “Populism”, https://www.britannica.com/topic/populism
https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/trensosial-46423230
https://www.dw.com/id/polri-duga-sejumlah-orang-ingin-belokkan-aksi-212-jadi-aksi-makar/a-36639736
https://nasional.tempo.co/read/825567/biaya-pengamanan-demo-411-dan-212-rp-76-miliar/full&view=ok
Hefner, in Religion and Politics, class note April 23, 2020
[1] Andre Munro, “Populism," https://www.britannica.com/topic/populism
[2] Pendapat dan Sikap Keagamaan Majelis Ulama Indonesia (Religious Opinion and Statement of Indonesian Ulema Council), October 11, 2016. https://news.detik.com/berita/d-3318150/mui-nyatakan-sikap-soal-ucapan-ahok-terkait-al-maidah-51-ini-isinya
[3] Estimates of the number of participants varied, depending on who makes estimation. Mathematical calculations from the media estimate that the participants of the action will be around 500,000 people. Nevertheless, the mass mobilization organizer asserts that the mobilization succeeded in moving more than seven million people. https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/trensosial-46423230
[4] https://nasional.tempo.co/read/825567/biaya-pengamanan-demo-411-dan-212-rp-76-miliar/full&view=ok
[5] https://www.dw.com/id/polri-duga-sejumlah-orang-ingin-belokkan-aksi-212-jadi-aksi-makar/a-36639736
[6] PPIM UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta, Api Dalam Sekam, Keberagamaan Muslim Gen-Z: Survei Nasional tentang Keberagaman di Sekolah and Universitas di Indonesia. 2017.
[7] Mietzner, Marcus, and Burhanuddin Muhtadi. "Explaining the 2016 Islamist Mobilisation in Indonesia: Religious Intolerance, Militant Groups and the Politics of Accommodation." Asian Studies Review, 42, no. 3 (2018): 481, 493.
[8] Mietzner, 485-493.
[9] Hefner, in Religion and Politics, class note April 23, 2020
[10] Hadiz, Vedi R. Islamic Populism in Indonesia and the Middle East. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2016.22.
[11] Hadiz, Islamic populism, 23-26.
[12] Hadiz, Islamic populism, 27-28, 42.
[13] Hadiz, Islamic populism, 187-88.
[14] Buehler, Michael. The Rise of Shari'a By-laws in Indonesian Districts: An Indication for Changing Patterns of Power Accumulation and Political Corruption. Southeast Asia Research 16, no. 2 (2008):256
[15] Buehler, The Rise of Shari’a By-laws, 280.
[16] Buehler, The Rise of Shari’a By-laws, 279-280.
[17] Chatterji, Angana P., Chatterji, A.P., Hansen, Thomas Blom, Hansen, T.B., Jaffrelot, Christophe, and Jaffrelot, C. Majoritarian State: How Hindu Nationalism Is Changing India. Oxford University Press, 2019.2-7.
[18] Hansen, Thomas Blom. The Saffron Wave: Democracy and Hindu Nationalism in Modern India. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999. 5-6.
[19] Hansen, The Saffron, 13.
[20] Brubaker, Rogers. Populism and Nationalism. Nations and Nationalism 26, no. 1 (2020):55-56.
[21] Brubaker, 54.
[22] Brubaker, 45.
[23] Hadiz, Vedi R, Richard Robison, 499.
[24] Hadiz, Vedi R, Richard Robison, and Angelos Chryssogelos. "Competing Populisms in Post-authoritarian Indonesia." International Political Science Review 38, no. 4 (2017): 488-502.
[25] Mietzner, Marcus. Reinventing Asian Populism: Jokowi's Rise, Democracy, and Political Contestation in Indonesia. Policy Studies, no. 72 (2015): 0_1-61,63-67,69-74,76.
[26] Hadiz, Vedi R, Richard Robison, 493.
[27] Tohir Bawazir, “Jalan Tengah Demokrasi: Antara Fundamentalisme dan Sekularisme," Pustaka Al-Kautsar, 2015, p. 199
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